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Regulatory Explosion: Observations on Understanding 
Utah Administrative Rules* 
William S. Callaghan, Ph.D.** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is straightforward and simple: to pro-
vide some understanding and underscore the importance of state admin-
istrative rules in Utah. This understanding is important because gov-
ernment regulation, largely the province of state agency rules, is often 
misunderstood and therefore mistrusted. Understanding is also impor-
tant to attorneys in administrative practice and to public administrators 
because in a mere fifteen years state administrative rules have 
grown-no, exploded-into a body of law that exceeds the volume pro-
duced by the legislature in the past 92 years. 1 Yet, probably few attor-
neys can correctly define "administrative rule" and only a minority of 
Utah judges and state administrators can accurately describe the place 
of rules in the hierarchy of law. Rules today-and predictably to-
morrow-govern much of our economic, social, and political life and 
affect the legal rights and privileges of every citizen of this state. While 
a complete dissertation on rules and rulemaking is beyond the scope of 
this article, an introduction to state administrative rules will be of bene-
fit as an opening to discussion of a relatively new field of Utah law. 
Before turning to the origins, impact, relevant features of and rea-
sons for administrative rules, some clarification of the subject is neces-
sary, particularly because many readers may have never knowingly en-
countered an "administrative rule." Administrative rules are those laws 
enacted by state executive branch agencies under the procedures of the 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, Title 63, Chapter 46a of the 
Utah Code. By definition, rules affect the legal rights and privileges of 
the public or other state agencies. They are the state equivalent of fed-
eral regulations enacted under the Federal Administrative Procedure 
Act (the "APA") and incorporate by reference a portion of the Code of 
* These comments were presented at the Western States Seminar on State and Local 
Administrative Law, sponsored by the BYU Journal of Public Law, on January 21, 1988. 
** Director, Utah State Division of Administrative Rules. 
I. Set in the same type-face, the Code Co. editions of the Utah statutes and the Utah Admin-
istrative Code have 3,063 and 3,512 pages of text, respectively. 
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Federal Regulations. Utah rules are codified in the Utah Administra-
tive Code which first appeared in print in January 1987.2 
II. RAPID GROWTH NATIO\"WIDE 
The reasons for the growth in state administrative rules, and their 
consequent impact on law, are obvious enough to require no lengthy 
explanation. While some might claim the regulatory explosion is evi-
dence of some nefarious plot, most political scientists would probably 
agree that most of the expansion of rulemaking is simply government's 
attempted practical response to the astounding increase in complexity of 
American society over the last generation. While population has grown 
rapidly, and the variety of businesses, social organizations, technological 
innovations, and consequent societal impacts, have grown geometrically, 
the number of legislative lawmakers and lawmaking units (states, coun-
ties, etc.) have remained relatively static. Regulation of society, needed 
in some degree for its functioning, therefore, has increasingly be-
come-for good or ill-the province of executive branch agencies. In 
effect, the "regulatory explosion" is largely due to the technological 
revolution and the compounding impact it has had, and continues to 
have, on our economy, society, and government. 
In exploring this proposition further, it should be noted that the 
rapid growth in administrative rules began in earnest with the New 
Deal of the 1930's when an overwhelmed Congress began to delegate 
lawmaking powers to federal agencies on a vastly greater scale than 
before. The 1946 Federal Administrative Procedure Act formalized the 
process of agency rulemaking.3 The resulting effects and present perva-
siveness of federal agency regulation need no elucidation. Similarly to 
their federal counterpart, state legislatures also discovered they could 
not keep up with regulatory demand using the ponderous legislative 
process. They too began to delegate lawmaking power and enacted state 
administrative procedure acts. In recent years, federal transfer of many 
regulatory functions to states has accelerated state rulemaking.4 And 
today, the larger volume of codified state law is rules, not statutes. 5 
2. The state equivalent of the Federal Register is the Utah State Bulletin, which appears 
semi-monthly and carries all proposed rules, notices of effective date, and other legal notices. 
Under Utah law, in conformity with federal usage, "rulemaking" is written as a single word. 
Also, "rule" refers to state administrative rules and the noun "regulation" denotes federal regula-
tions. See DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES, RuLEWRITING MANUAL FOR UTAH 5, 29 
(1987). 
3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982). Undoubtedly the sponsors of the Act never would have fore-
seen today's Code of Federal Regulations expanding to 103,000 pages. 
4. A. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING 3-4, 16-19 (1986). 
5. The California administrative code, for example, contains some 35,000 pages. 
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A result of the legislative branch's transfer of power to agencies 
has been an almost unnoticed dichotomy of lawmaking. Perhaps uncon-
sciously, legislators began to recognize they had neither the time nor 
expertise to provide highly complex or technologically sophisticated 
standards and procedures for their programs and requirements. They 
could not remain constantly in session to meet rapidly changing condi-
tions and emergencies. Even if legislatures had the time and resources, 
reaching consensus on the specific criteria of statute application often 
proved an impossible or politically unrewarding task. Legislators, 
therefore, presumably concluded that they would provide the policy, the 
guidelines, and the limits by statute while the executive branch agen-
cies, staffed by full-time administrators and experts, would fill in the 
details through rulemaking. However, exceptions to this dichotomy be-
tween legislative statute and executive branch rule abound. Few legisla-
tors feel comfortable with this transfer of power, or what some consider 
an abdication of responsibility. Nevertheless, most realize the necessity 
of agency lawmaking to avoid the cost, inefficiencies, and political con-
sequences of a full-time, professional legislature. 
III. RAPID GROWTH IN UTAH 
Rulemaking is relatively new to Utah because our economy and 
social needs have not been as diversified as in larger states. Although 
the legislature delegated some rulemaking powers to agencies earlier, 
only in 1973 did lawmakers formalize the process with the Utah Ad-
ministrative Rulemaking Act (Act).6 Based on the 1961 Model State 
Rulemaking Act (MSAPA), the Utah Act provided for publication of 
proposed rules, a 30-day public comment period, publication of the 
adopted rule, and a 20-day waiting period before implementation. Be-
cause the Act required rules whenever agency activity affected public 
functions, agencies quickly discovered extensive rulewriting was neces-
sary to comply with the law. The Public Service Commission needed 
rules to regulate utilities, the Tax Commission to specify filing and 
appeals procedures, and Social Services to provide standards for assis-
tance payments. The State Auditor needed rules for local government 
audits and the Lt. Governor for elections. Even internal service agen-
cies, like the Divisions of Finance and Personnel Management, re-
quired rules to regulate state employee travel and hiring practices. As 
the public or special interest groups demanded more regulation to meet 
new needs, agencies required more rules. Without listing all rule cate-
gories, suffice it to say that nearly every state agency found itself re-
6. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-46a-1 to 63-46a-16 (Supp. !987). 
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sponsible for regulating through rulemaking some aspect of nearly 
every Utah citizen's, or other state agency's affairs. 
By 1973, the regulatory explosion had already affected state gov-
ernment, within six months agencies had filed 233 rules. The number 
of filings increased to an average of 632 per year, or nearly 2.5 per 
working day.7 In 1985, attempting to keep up with the deluge of fil-
ings, the legislature reduced the requirements to one publication and a 
single 30-day comment period.8 By 1986, the state had accumulated 
17,400 single-spaced pages of rules, a massive, unmanageable volume 
of material enacted by 126 agencies. 9 A large portion of this material 
was not properly administrative rules. Procedural and content errors 
created vast potential for state legal liability. No compilation or readily 
accessible source for researching rules existed, either for agencies or the 
public. In short, Utah administrative rules were massive, pervasive, 
confusing, and inaccessible. 
IV. THE RESPONSE OF STATE GOVERNMENT 
In 1983, legislators became concerned enough with the expansion 
of state rulemaking to begin applying restraints. They suspected, some-
times with reason', that agency rules did not always carry out the intent 
of the authorizing statute. Consequent amendments to the Act estab-
lished a "sunset" provision requiring review and re-enactment of rules 
after five years, and created a legislative Administrative Rules Review 
Committee to exercise oversight. 10 
These changes did not end legislators' worries. In 1987 a bill 
passed permitting the Review Committee to delay the effective date of 
rules pending consideration by the full legislature. 11 The governor ve-
toed the bill as a violation of constitutional separation of powers. In 
1988 the legislature will consider a bill requiring rules to be approved 
annually by the full body of legislators as well as a proposed constitu-
tional amendment similar to the 1987 bill. 12 These measures are forms 
7. In one two-week period in November 1987, agencies filed liS rules and amendments. 
"Filing" includes amendments, repeals, temporary ("emergency") rules, as well as new rules. 
8. H.B. 217, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1985 Utah Laws 279. 
9. 0HICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES, REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE PROJECT 
PURSUANT TO GOVERNOR'S EXECUTIVE ORDER OF FEBRUARY 3, 1986, (February 5, 1987) 
[Hereinafter REPORT]. 
10. H.B. 25, 44th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1983 Utah Laws 1163. The legislature overrode a guber-
natorial veto. 
II. H.B. 178, 48th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1987 Utah Laws -. 
12. H.B. 44, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1988 Utah Laws-. and H.j. Res. 9, 47th Leg., Gen. 
Sess., 1988 Utah Laws -, prefiled for the 1988 General Session. (Postscript: both bills failed to 
pass.) 
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of a legislative veto over administrative rules, and demonstrate the be-
lief of many legislators that the regulatory explosion has gone too far. 
Another outgrowth of legislative concern over administrative rules 
was the creation in 1985 of the Office (later "Division") of Administra-
tive Rules in the Department of Administrative Services. Prior to 1985, 
State Archives had been responsible for recording and publication of 
rules. The Administrative Rules Review Committee, in particular, was 
not satisfied that Archives adequately policed or provided access to 
rules. Therefore, over some executive branch resistance, the legislature 
established a separate office to provide rules with more "visibility and 
accountability."13 The Division registers publishes and compiles agency 
rules, and generally administers the Act. While the Division has editing 
powers similar to those of legislative staff, it has no authority, unlike 
many states' offices of administrative law, to review rules for content or 
legal conformity. 14 
Lack of any kind of rule compilation, and the consequent public 
difficulty in learning what rules affected them also concerned legisla-
tors. Therefore, in 1985, the legislature mandated and funded develop-
ment of Utah's first administrative code; and, in 1987, the legislature 
provided a statutory mechanism for periodic recodification of rules. 111 
Since its creation, a primary objective of the Division of Administrative 
Rules has been to organize rules in an indexed and computerized code. 
In 1986, the governor responded to the legislative initiative by or-
dering agencies to review and revise their rules using the Division's 
format, and prepare them as word processing documents for the new 
code. 16 Agencies reduced 17,400 pages to approximately 7 500 (a 61 
percent reduction), by eliminating archaic, redundant, and inappropri-
ate material. 17 On July 1, 1987, the Division repealed all existing rules 
and enacted the first Utah Administrative Code. 18 The code resides on 
a continuously-updated computer data base and is printed in a four-
volume paperbound set. Therefore, through concern over the growth of 
administrative rules, the legislature and the governor have provided a 
13. The words are those of the Committee Senate Chairman during the hearing on location 
of the administrative rules function within the state organization, December 4, 1984. The Gover-
nor did not sign House Bill 27 (which made Administrative Rules a Division) of the 1987 General 
Session. 
14. See UTAH CoDE ANN. § 63-46a-9.5, 10, 10.5 (Supp. 1987). 
15. Authorized in H.B. 217, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1985 Utah Laws 279, and H.B. 27, 48th 
Leg., Gen. Sess., 1987 Utah Laws-, respectively. See UTAH ConE ANN.§§ 63-46a-1, et al. and 
§ 63-46a-1 0.5. 
16. Governor's Executive Order of February 3, 1986. 
17. REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-3. 
18. STATE OF UTAH, UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODF. 1987-1988 (1987). 
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new accessibility to rules for the expressed purpose of a more open, 
accountable, and efficient state government. 
V. UNDERSTANDING WHAT AN ADMINISTRATIVE RuLE Is 
Notwithstanding the efforts of state government to reduce rules, 
make them more visible and accessible, and increase efficiency and ac-
curacy in rulemaking, there remain confusion and misunderstanding 
about rules among the public, and more alarming, within the legal 
community. Just as many of our attorneys and public administrators 
enter practice with little or no training in administrative law, even 
more deficient is their knowledge of administrative rules. Any knowl-
edge they may have about rulemaking is usually federal, not state. Yet, 
if they enter a practice in state or local public service, it will be state 
rules they are most likely to research, write, and follow from day to 
day, not federal regulations. These reasons warrant a closer scrutiny of 
what administrative rules are. 
An administrative rule is a law enacted by an agency exercising its 
administrative-some say "legislative" -powers. A rule implements a 
legislative mandate by providing interpretation, standards, or proce-
dures with which to apply the mandate. In effect, a rule is an extension 
of a statute, supplying those details of application not provided by the 
legislature. Unfortunately, the concept of an administrative rule pro-
vided by the 1973 Utah Administrative Rule-making Act was quite 
broad and vague and led to confusion in its application. Revisions of 
the Act in 1985 and 1987 have narrowed and specified the meaning 
and use of administrative rules. 
By definition, an administrative rule must conform to four general 
criteria. A rule must (1) be "explicitly or implicitly required by state or 
federal statute, or other applicable law;" (2) have "the effect of law;" 
(3) "implement or interpret a state or federal legal mandate;" and ( 4) 
apply "to a class of persons or another agency."19 Additionally and 
more specifically, rules are required when an agency's action "autho-
rizes, requires, or prohibits an action," and "provides or prohibits a 
material benefit. " 20 Rules are not broad policy guidelines, agency or-
ders, adjudicative decisions dealing with specific persons and situations, 
nor internal management policies governing enrolled students, persons 
in state custody, or agency employees. 
The key terms for understanding administrative rules are: "Imple-
ment or interpret," "class of persons," "material benefit" and "autho-
19. !d. at§ 63-46a-2(13). 
20. !d. at § 63-46a-3(2). 
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rizes, requires, or prohibits." Rules require preceding law, usually a 
statute, or possibly a constitutional provision or court order. The rule 
then implements or interprets this preceding law. Rules are therefore 
dependent on other laws and may not be created or exist in a vacuum. 
Rules part company with adjudicative actions and agency orders be-
cause they apply to a class of persons, not a specific plaintiff, appli-
cant, or institution. "Class" is usually indicated by the term "all," as in 
"all applicants," "all refineries," or "all trucks over two tons." Fur-
thermore, rules are confined to those governmental actions that have 
some significant or material effect, that authorize, require or prohibit 
activity. Rules are not purely advisory, informative, or descriptive; they 
are laws which substantively affect the public's legal rights and 
privileges. 
Despite efforts to make the definition of "administrative rule" 
clear and precise, knowing when rules are necessary is still a delicate 
exercise for most state agencies. Frequently the legislature makes the 
choice simple by including in the governing statute the phrases "by 
rule" or "shall make rules." More often, the legislature mandates a 
function without mention of the word "rule," and the agency must turn 
to the Act to determine what rules, if any, are necessary to carry out 
that activity. The Act has the effect of providing a broad mandate-and 
therefore authority or power-to an agency to make rules whenever 
any of its activities meets the criteria for rulemaking. The purpose of 
this grant of authority is to ensure that agencies do not carry on an 
activity, which affects legal rights or privileges, without giving the pub-
lic the opportunity to review and comment upon it. Therefore, the Act 
states that rules are required by law "explicitly or implicitly" to ac-
count for the frequent lack of explicit rulemaking authority outside the 
Act itself. 
For example, there may be no reference to a state university's 
rulemaking authority in its governing statutes; yet the university con-
ducts many statutorily authorized activities clearly requiring some kind 
of uniform regulation. The university's administrators must therefore 
look to the Act for guidance on which regulations require rulemaking 
and which do not. The Act specifically exempts "agency action [apply-
ing] only to internal agency management" and "students enrolled in a 
state education institution."21 Therefore, the administration's regulation 
of employee and student conduct is "policy," as defined by the Act, and 
does not require rulemaking procedure. Admissions, public parking, 
and public use of facilities, however, involve classes of persons (e.g., 
21. /d. at § 653-46a-3(4). 
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"all applicants") other than enrolled students or employees. Regulation 
of these "material benefits" for these classes require rulemaking. 
Because the range of governmental activity is virtually limitless, no 
definition of when rulemaking is required is likely to cover all possibili-
ties. Therefore, required rulemaking is often not clear-cut. While the 
agency may turn to counsel or the Division of Administrative Rules for 
an opinion, the Act implicitly leaves to agency discretion the decision of 
when rules are necessary. 
However, presuming the legislature's mandate is reasonably clear, 
and that the statute does not specifically require rules, a question re-
mains: Why have rules? Or, at least, why have the time and resource-
consuming requirements of a rulemaking act? Why not leave to agency 
discretion the proper interpretation and implementation of the will of 
the legislature? The reasons are several and are central to understand-
ing administrative rules. 
VI. WHY HAVE RULES? 
A. Due Process Rights And Administrative Discretion 
One reason for rulemaking is that the courts have long frowned 
upon unbridled administrative discretion when agency action does, in 
fact, affect legal rights. 22 While it is again not within the scope of this 
analysis to discourse exhaustively on a complex issue, the relationship 
between rulemaking and due process merits examination. 
Just as it is a given assumption of this article that rules on elec-
tions, business practices, and welfare benefits affect Utah citizens politi-
cally, economically, and socially, equally obviously, agency actions sub-
ject to rulemaking do, by definition, affect legal rights and privileges. 
Constitutional due process, therefore, would appear to be reason for 
rulemaking procedures of publication, comment and hearing. However, 
courts have been reluctant to impose a general Fourteenth Amendment 
due process requirement on state rulemaking. A few state courts have 
imposed rulemaking as a due process requirement in specific situations. 
Interestingly, the Oregon Supreme Court, while finding rulemaking a 
necessary prerequisite to agency action for other reasons, ruled in 
Megdal v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 23 that agency 
legislative action is not subject to constitutional due process safeguards. 
22. K. DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE chs. 8, 9 (2 ed. Supp. 1984) (explores 
extensively the issue of discretion). 
23. 288 Or. 293, 605 P.2d 273 (1980). Arthur Bonfield, in his article, Mandating State 
Agency Lawmaking by Rule, supra p. 161 184, discusses this case and others involving the due 
process issue. 
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However, even if courts have not uniformly imposed due process 
on agency regulation, the Utah legislature has, and the courts gener-
ally, and the Utah courts specifically, have held agencies strictly ac-
countable for fulfilling the procedural requirements of rulemaking. In a 
series of cases, culminating in 1986 with Williams v. the Public Service 
Commission of Utah, 24 and Lane v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 211 the Utah Supreme Court overturned agency ac-
tions holding, "the rules of an administrative agency are not valid un-
less the agency complies with the rule-making [sic] procedures pre-
scribed in the Rule Making [sic] Act." Other states' courts have been 
equally stern in requiring agency compliance with even the smallest 
detail of rulemaking procedure. One state overturned an agency action 
simply because the pertaining rule was not properly on file with the 
Secretary of State.26 
Other courts have gone further in imposing a strict interpretation 
of rulemaking requirements for agencies. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that "an agency determination must be considered an ad-
ministrative rule when all or most of the relevant features of adminis-
trative rules are present and preponderate in favor of the rule-making 
[sic] process,"27 rather than when the agency thinks a rule is necessary. 
The same court reasoned elsewhere that "the chief function of executive 
agencies is to implement statutes through the adoption of coherent reg-
ulatory schemes,"28 ••• "the function of promulgating administrative 
rules and regulations lies at the very heart of the administrative pro-
cess. " 29 The clear message of these cases is that once the legislature has 
imposed a "due process" requirement on agencies, the courts will 
strictly enforce it. 
Even in the absence of statutorily-mandated rulemaking, the 
courts' trend seems to be to force a "due process" requirement on agen-
cies by overturning actions judged excessively discretionary. At the fed-
eral level, court limitation of administrative discretion reached it apex 
·only one year after rulemaking formally began in Utah in Morton v. 
Ruiz. 30 In this decision, the Supreme Court established that (1) the 
power to administer a program requires rules, and therefore discretion 
without a guiding rule can be held invalid; and (2) agency policy is 
"ineffective" unless embodied in rules. In Ford Motor Company v. 
24. 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986). 
25. 727 P.2d 206 (Utah 1986). 
26. Cuevas v. Coughlin, 130 A.D. 2d 888, 516 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 1987). 
27. Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 478 A.2d 742 (1984). 
28. General Assembly v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 385, 448 A.2d 438, 443 (1982). 
29. /d. at 376, 448 A.2d at 443. 
30. 415 U.S. 199 (1974). 
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FTC, 31 a federal court ordered the FTC to "change the law" by 
rulemaking rather than by order whenever the change had "widespread 
impact." Other circuit and Supreme Court decisions have by no means 
closely followed Ruiz and no consistent federal doctrine on administra-
tive discretion has emerged. 
State courts have required rulemaking more regularly while limit-
ing discretion. Because of their lower visibility and for other reasons 
described at length by Arthur Bonfield, state courts, as in the New 
York and New Jersey cases cited, appear more ready to equate 
rulemaking with due process.32 The trend may well be as one writer, 
Kenneth Culp Davis, predicts: "the law may be in the early stages of a 
massive movement toward judicially required rulemaking that will re-
duce discretion unguided by rules or precedents."33 
A danger, lies however, in excessive rulemaking-the reaction to 
court curbs on administrative discretion. Straightjacketing agencies in 
rules destroys the flexibility necessary to meet constantly-changing cir-
cumstances. Overly restrictive rules may create formalism, ritualism, 
and waste in administration. Fortunately, courts generally decline to 
substitute their judgment for an agency's on the content of rules, partic-
ularly on administrative interpretation of governing statutes.34 There-
fore, within the limits of the Constitution, the statutory definition of 
rule, and the rulemaking procedures, agencies have retained discretion 
over the substantive aspects of their mandated functions. 
Unlike most state rulemaking acts, the Utah Act addresses directly 
the issue of due process rights versus administrative discretion. A clause 
unique to the Utah Act, ensures agency discretionary capability. Sec-
tion 63-46a-3(8)(a) reads: "This chapter is not intended to inhibit the 
exercise of agency discretion within the limits prescribed by statute or 
agency rule." This easily overlooked, somewhat cryptic paragraph is 
the key to the entire Act and to understanding administrative rules in 
the state of Utah. It embodies the underlying philosophy of the Act. Its 
intent is to instruct administrators and the courts alike that agencies 
shall set boundaries to their actions, to the exercise of their discretion-
ary functions, through administrative rules. The courts in turn shall 
permit discretion, barring unconstitutional or obviously illegal activity, 
within the parameters of those rules. 
A second paragraph in the Act reinforces the rulemaking (or due 
process) requirement. Section 63-46a-1 ( 6) requires that agencies "enact 
31. 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981). 
32. See BoNFIELD, supra note 4, at 118-23. 
33. 2 DAVIS, supra note 22, at 128. 
34. 2 DAVIS, supra note 22, at 421. 
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rules incorporating the principles of law established by final [adminis-
trative] adjudicative decisions" within 90 days. 86 The purpose of the 
admonition is not to require codification of all adjudicative decisions, 
but only those establishing "final," rule-like "principles of law" of gen-
eral applicability. Yet clearly, the intent is to proscribe creation of ad-
ministrative common law and to require agencies to regulate by rule 
rather than adjudication.86 Unequivocally in Utah, administrative activ-
ity must be governed by statute or rule. 
B. Other Reasons For Rules 
To the question "why have rules," then, we have, so far, two an-
swers: because the courts require them through their decisions regard-
ing due process and agency discretion, and because the legislature, 
through the Utah Act, mandates them. 
Additionally, rules serve to protect the interests of the state and its 
taxpayers. Allowing an administrator to eschew rulemaking is to invite 
liability for unwarranted agency action and consequent damage in an 
age of unparalleled tort suits against "deep-pocketed" government. The 
administrator who overlooks or violates his rules risks, not only the tax-
payer's money, but his own-the crumbling bulwark of sovereign im-
munity and indemnity statutes notwithstanding. 87 In short, as public 
administrators we have rules for self-protection, for the guidance of our 
employees, and as a defense against damage suits where an employee 
may have strayed, unauthorized, beyond the limits of the rule. 
Finally, there is a better, simpler, and more positive reason for 
administrative rules than those listed above. Rules and the rulemaking 
process open government to the governed. Public comment periods and 
hearings permit citizen input and participation in government. They 
open government to new ideas and consideration of consequences that 
may be otherwise overlooked. Published rules inform the public about 
the inner workings of government, lifting a sometimes perceived myste-
rious veil of secrecy. They give people more confidence in and less sus-
35. After preparation of this article, this section of the Act was amended in the 1988 Legisla-
tive Session. 88 Utah State Bulletin 20 (March 15, 1988). Other than changing the time limit to 
120 days, the amendment did not substantively affect the clause as discussed in the text. 
36. In footnote 166 of his paper prepared for this issue, Arthur Bonfield critiques the Utah 
provision concluding the requirement is "defective." Ironically, it was at Professor Bonfield's sug-
gestion that the paragraph was inserted in the 1987 amendments to the Rulemaking Act. Unfortu-
nately-from Bonfield's presumed viewpoint-the original language taken from the 1981 MSAPA 
suffered mutations in drafting, hearings, and a floor amendment-not unexpected of a controver-
sial measure in the legislative process. However arguably, the paragraph still fulfills the purpose 
of the original model, if perhaps more strictly. 
37. P. SCHUCK, SUING Govt:RNMt:NT: Crnzt:N Rt:Mt:Dit:S FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 144 
(1983) 
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picion about their state institutions. Rules allowing for proper adminis-
trative discretion create better-educated and efficient employees, and 
better-run programs. Rules can help make government activity uniform 
and equitable, and insure against arbitrary or capricious application of 
law or bestowal of benefits. Open government is accountable govern-
ment, more productive and more in tune with public need. Administra-
tive rules, for all the burden and expense they may create for regulators 
and the regulated alike, may be viewed as a public benefit. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Administrative rules are not intrinsically good or bad. Widespread 
distrust of agency rules probably has more to do with ignorance of 
them then their actual merits. The intent of this article has been to 
inform the reader and, hopefully, remove some of that 
misunderstanding. 
The explosion in administrative regulation is due, after all, to the 
design of our governmental institutions coupled with the technological 
revolution and unprecedented growth in social-economic complexity. In 
Utah, growth in the importance of administrative rules is evidenced by 
their volume, pervasiveness, and by legislative actions to create proce-
dures and institutions to keep them under control. 
Rules are also important because they are laws which substan-
tively effect the public's legal rights and privileges. Utah's statute gov-
erning rulemaking attempts to strike a balance between public rights 
and agency discretion. Our state has rules for essentially four reasons: 
(1) because the courts require them, (2) because the legislature man-
dates them through the Rulemaking Act, (3) to protect the state from 
unwarranted lawsuit, and (4) to provide public access to government. 
In evaluating administrative rules, we should not mistake content 
for form. It may be that some rules handcuff the regulator, oppress the 
regulated, and subvert the legislative process, yet others protect individ-
ual rights, facilitate administration, and open government to the gov-
erned. Understanding administrative rules is the first step toward 
changing the former and promoting the latter in the best interests of the 
people of Utah. 
